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acknowledged that a final agency action may have occurred, it argued
that the only reviewable action was a 2000 decision not to amend the
regulation-not the regulation itself. Since the 2000 EPA decision
marked the end of the agency's decisionmaking process, the court
held that the decision qualified as a final agency action. In response to
the EPA's argument, EPIC claimed it was bringing an "as applied"
action; or in the alternative, that the 2000 decision not to amend the
regulation opened the provision open for review, and therefore, open
The court found EPIC's "as applied" argument
to challenge.
unpersuasive since EPIC had not been the object of any EPA
enforcement proceeding, nor had EPIC directly petitioned the EPA to
amend the regulation. However, the court agreed with EPIC that the
2000 action opened the regulation to challenge since the agency
reconsidered the entire issue at the time and invited comments on the
provision. Thus, because the final agency action occurred on July 13,
2000, and the EPIC filed its complaint on July 24, 2001, the court held
that the action fell within the six-year statute of limitations.
Kate 0. Lively

Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 301 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (N.D.
Cal. 2004) (holding that, under the Clean Water Act, a claim alleging
increased logging in a watershed created increased sediment in a
creek and alleging ditch use to discharge storm water and pollutants
stated a claim for which relief could be granted).
Pacific Lumber Company and Scotia Pacific Lumber Company
("Lumber Companies") owned land located in a watershed the
Lumber Companies used primarily for logging. The Environmental
Protection Information Center ("EPIC") brought suit in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California against the
Lumber Companies, the United States Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") Administrator, and the EPA. EPIC claimed the
Lumber Companies discharged pollutants without obtaining a
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit.
EPIC asserted the Lumber Companies violated the Clean Water Act
("CWA") by logging in a watershed causing a large increase in
sediment deposited into Bear Creek. The EPIC further argued the
Lumber Companies were using culverts and drainage ditches to
discharge pollutants and storm water, creating a point source under
the CWA. The Lumber Companies filed a motion to dismiss, asserting
EPIC's complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be
granted.
The first issue was whether discharging storm water via culverts and
The CWA
ditches constituted a point source under the CWA.
prohibits discharging pollutants from a point source into the navigable
waters of the United States without an NPDES permit. The CWA
defines a point source as a discernable conveyance from various
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sources, including ditches. Hence, accepting EPIC's allegatio-as as
true, the district court held the Lumber Companies discharged
pollutants from a point source.
Next at issue was whether the CWA exempted the Lumber
Companies' discharges as a storm water discharge. Although the CWA
requires permits for discharges from point sources, section 402 of the
CWA exempts discharges comprised entirely of storm water. The
district court applied a two-part inquiry in determining whether the
storm water exception applied. First, the court addressed whether the
Lumber Companies' discharges were comprised entirely of storm
water. In its complaint, EPIC asserted that the Lumber Companies
used culverts and drainage ditches to discharge storm water and
pollutants. Hence, accepting as true all allegations in the complaint,
the court concluded the Lumber Companies were not exempt from
NPDES permit requirements because the discharges were not
comprised entirely of storm water.
Secondly, the court addressed whether the Lumber Companies'
In 1987, EPA passed
discharges were currently unregulated.
regulations authorizing states and the EPA to continue to regulate
exempt storm water discharges on a case-by-case basis. Additionally,
the CWA expressly regulates point source discharges. Hence, the
Lumber Companies discharges were not exempt from the NPDES
permitting requirement because the CWA regulates point source
discharges.
Accordingly, the court denied the Lumber Companies' motion to
dismiss because the Lumber Companies discharged storm water and
pollution from a point source, the discharges were not exempt as
storm water because they were not comprised entirely of storm water,
and the CWA regulates point source discharges.
HeatherK Chamberlain

North Carolina Shellfish Growers Ass'n v. Holly Ridge Assocs., No.
7:01-CV-36-BO(3), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13676 (E.D.N.C. July 25,
2003) (granting representational standing for organizations to pursue
Clean Water Act citizen suit claims in federal court; holding that
disputed ditches, wetlands and other waters were subject to Clean
Water Act jurisdiction; that stormwater and sediment discharged into
jurisdictional waters from point sources were pollutants, and therefore
subject to permitting under the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System; and reserving judgment on whether fecal coliform
bacteria constituted a pollutant under the Clean Water Act).
The North Carolina Coastal Federation ("NCCF") and North
Carolina Shellfish Growers Association ("NCSGA") filed a Clean Water
Act ("CWA") citizen suit for violations of sections 402 and 404 of the
CWA caused by ditching and excavation activities on a 1,262-acre tract

